When smiling, top Indian officials stood side by side with senior leaders of the Hizb ul Mujahideen, the predominant (some would say the only) Kashmiri insurgent force (the others comprise of non-Kashmiris, especially Pakistanis and Afghans) fighting Indian troops in Jammu and Kashmir, it appeared that they were cheering a major breakthrough for peace in that tragedy. But the smiles were too early, even in that bright drawing room in Srinagar, taking too much for granted from those behind the men in masks and those without.

Within days, those smiles were gone, replaced by the tension and worry lines of the past years. Once again,a small chance for a little peace had fallen through the cracks in the floor and one could presume that haste had something to do with it as much as the violent opposition of our neighbour, whose only raison d'etre for existence appears to be a blind hatred of India.

Although internationally India may even have come out looking better than the others in this drama - the United States pointedly stressed that bringing in Pakistan as an after thought following the ceasefire announcement was not a move that would have been acceptable to any serious negotiations. Pakistan was forced into a corner and reacted only as it could.

Yet, there are still some issues that need to be discussed.

In this context, the Indian government's long experience as far as negotiations with the Naga militant groups is concerned is worth looking at. Discussions with the Naga leadership of the dominant faction (Isak Swu-T Muivah group) of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) have gone on for over three years. A ceasefire, first announced in 1997 July by the then prime minister H D Deve Gowda, has endured all these months and been renewed despite confrontations and serious differences between the two sides.

As a result of the ceasefire, there is today a Ceasefire Monitoring Cell with members from both sides, which studies complaints of ceasefire violations by Indian troops and the insurgents. There is a code of conduct, as it were, which bans the insurgents from carrying weapons within town limits and other designated places; in addition, the central Indian forces, meaning the army and the Assam Rifles, apart from the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), which have been the main striking formations against Naga militants since the 1950s when the insurgency first flared, are virtually restricted to barracks in Nagaland.

They have been active in Assam and Manipur but not much in Nagaland where the India-NSCN (I-M) ceasefire has been most effective these past 36 months. This means that the state police are unencumbered by the ceasefire although they have not been involved in many confrontations.

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The ceasefire, which was first informally extended by New Delhi to other areas such as the hills of Manipur where Nagas are dominant, has now to all purposes been extended to all parts of the Northeast where the NSCN (I-M) is functional. This is the latest step in the three-year process and follows discussins in Bangkok with I-M leaders before the ceasefire was renewed. This decision may not be liked by the governments of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, for it could bring them directly in conflict with the Naga group without the support of the Central forces. But if good sense prevails on either side (and politicians are shrewd bargainers and quick to turn opportunities to their advantage), this can be seen as another reason for both sides to stay away from fighting, increasing the area for peace.

The peace process thus strengthens chances for people from civil society to continue developing the building blocks for a long-term peace and honourable settlement between the two sides. Credible non-government organisations have been active especially from within Naga society.

The Naga saga, until recent years, has seen the "underground" fighters appear in a more honourable light than other groups fighting for "independence" in different parts of this country, not to speak of Kashmir and Punjab, the latter in a 10-year period between 1982 and 1992. We all know how the latter was crushed, with brute state force - but which had public sanction, especially in the rural areas where families, especially women had been assaulted.

The Naga fighters, on the whole, have not targeted civilians although their methods of extracting "taxes" amounting to nothing less than blatant extortion has brought them a bad name in recent times. This problem is not just confined to one group but is true for others operating in the Northeast. Incidents of rape and molestation are rare - and more heard and documented in relation to the behaviour of the Central Indian forces. Yet, again since the ceasefire, more Nagas have died in the internecine fighting between the dominant groups than in clashes with Indian troops.

Another significant element of the peace talks has been the fact that they took place after much preparation between Deve Gowda and the Naga leaders, Th Muivah and Issak Swu abroad. These have been followed up, without much obvious progress, by the Prime Minister's Special Negotiator and the Naga leaders. The Naga problem is not new - it is more than 50 years old. Obviously, it will take time and trouble to resolve it to the satisfaction and honour of all concerned.

The process received a major impetus because of the lack of media hype and government propaganda. The talks, at the Hague, in Geneva and Bangkok, have been unconditional, low-key. The interlocutors have never gone beyond a customary paragraph or two about the discussions in press statements. If one is to tackle such difficult problems, clearly patience is the key as well as sensitivity to each other's concerns.

Talks on issues of such vast portend must always be unconditional. India has agreed to this approach in the Naga case and offered no less in the Kashmir situation. But for such talks to have a chance of success, they must also be secret -- at least at the initial stage, if either side is not to be trapped by rhetoric and public posturing.

This does not mean that leaders of the talks are not accessible to the media. They are and have been. But the talks themselves have not been held hostage by the genie of false publicity.

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The Naga issue is not as simple as it looks. At one time, both the People's Republic of China and Pakistan were deeply involved in it. China withdrew from the scene in the mid-1970s but Pakistan still plays a role, through the ubiquitous ISI, in the Northeast although one tends to believe that this role is exaggerated by Indian security agencies. There is something called indigenous genius and capability!

At the peoples level, informal peacemakers continue to fight the internal demons that torment and trouble the Naga people, including ethnic divisions, extortion, and corruption.

Without the ceasefire and statesmanship on either side, even this would not have been possible. The Naga leadership has recongised that it is in the interests of their people to hold talks with New Delhi. There has been extensive pressure on them to do so from civil society in the area. The continuation of the talks is an expression of faith in their own people and vice versa. They have not lost their long-term vision. But they are realistic enough to realise that time does not wait for any one.

The Nagas have held talks, infructuously, with the Indian government in the 1960s; one group signed a peace accord that was denounced by others in 1975 and now the present fragile process holds the hope of a genuine, long-term peace.

Is such statesmanship too much to expect of the Kashmiri leaders? Can they function without Pakistan's control? Who does the bloodletting help? Can both sides on the Kashmir Line of Control have access to each other, uniting families and opening up trade and communications? All these will take time - but it is well said that the longest journey begins with the smallest step.

The Naga militants, who continue to believe in separation, have shown that it is possible to take that step, if one has the true interests of the people at heart.

Let that step be taken quietly, away from the cameras and notebooks of the media.